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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
35-1-86. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission improperly determined that Petitioners were not 
dependents under Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-71. 
2. Whether or not the Industrial Commission properly applied the law in determining burden 
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of proof for establishing dependency. 
3. Whether or not the Industrial Commission committed error by failing to construe the 
workers' compensation statute liberally in favor of the Petitioners. 
4. Whether the Industrial Commission's decision and order are supported by adequate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
5. Whether the Petitioners' due process rights have been denied by virtue of the Industrial 
Commission and Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact or if they are arbitrarily 
capricious or wholly without cause. 
6. Whether Temporary Total Disability Compensation had accrued and should have been 
awarded. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Industrial Commission. The case arose from an 
industrial accident occurring on May 17, 1994 when Barney Caporoz was injured while in the 
course and scope of his employment with Uninsured Handyman Willie. Mr. Caporoz died on 
December 17, 1994 after being in a coma for six months. The Petitioners are sister and half-sister 
to the Decedent who resided with Decedent at the time of the injury. Petitioners are claiming they 
are entitled to workers compensation benefits by virtue of their dependency upon the support and 
maintenance of the Decedent. 
Course of the Proceedings 
1. On October 4, 1994, Petitioner Verna Caporoz filed a Protection of Rights claim for and 
on behalf of Barney Caporoz. 
2. On May 5, 1995, Petitioner Verna Caporoz filed a claim for dependent benefits and burial 
expenses with the Industrial Commission. 
4 
3. A hearing was held before Judge Donald L. George of the Industrial Commission. 
4. Judge Donald L. George signed a prepared Order on April 3, 1996. 
5. A Motion for Review was timely filed on May 3, 1996. 
Disposition at the Industrial Commission 
The Industrial Commission denied the Motion for Review on October 30, 1996 
determining that Petitioners were not entitled to Dependent benefits. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
L On May 17, 1994, Barney Caporoz was working for Handy Man Willie, an Uninsured 
Employer when he was injured by accident arising out of and in the course of his 
employment. See Judge George Findings of Fact, Paragraph 1, page 2, Industrial 
Commission Findings of Fact, page 1. 
2. Barney Caporoz was in a coma until December 17, 1994 when he died from the May 17, 
1994 accident. See Medical Record Exhibit and Industrial Commission Findings of Fact 
pagel. 
3. At the time of the accident, Barney Caporoz resided with his sister Verna Caporoz and 
half-sister, Roxsanne Clastimodo. See Judge George Findings of Fact Paragraph 4, page 3 
and Industrial Commission Findings of Fact page 2. 
4. On October 4, 1994, Applicant Verna Caporoz filed a Claim for Protection of Rights as it 
deals with her deceased brother, Barney Caporoz. She indicated that at the time of the 
injury, her brother was in a coma as a result of an industrial injury. 
5. On May 5, 1995, Applicant filed a Claim for Dependents' Benefits and/or burial benefits. 
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See Industrial Commission Findings of Fact page 3, 
6. In 1988, the Petitioners moved from Hawaii to Utah to Plain City. Three years later, in 
1992, the Deceased moved into a rental home of his sisters, the Applicants. See Judge 
George Findings of Fact, Paragraph 4, page 3, Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, 
page 2. 
7. In 1992, the Petitioners were paying rent of $275.00 per month. The Landlord increased 
the rent to $400.00 per month and the sisters needed assistance and support to pay the 
rent and other expenses. See Findings of Fact by Judge Donald L. George Paragraph 5, 
page 3, Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, page 2. 
8. The sisters testified they could not maintain the rent in said home without the assistance of 
their brother. Had the Deceased not moved in with his sisters, they could not afford said 
home. See Judge George Findings of Fact, paragraph 8, page 3. 
9. After Barney Caporoz moved in, he purchased the family two additional vehicles, living 
room furniture, and other furniture. See Judge George Findings of Fact, paragraphs 10, 
11, 12, page 3 and Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, page 2. 
10. He further increased the lifestyle of the Petitioners by paying for all recreation, taking the 
Petitioners to Lagoon and Wendover. See Judge George Findings of Fact, Paragraph 13, 
page 4 and Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, page 2. 
11. The Deceased also lessened expenses by performing all of the maintenance on the home 
and on the vehicles. See Judge George Findings of Fact, Paragraph 14, page 4 and 
Industrial Commission Findings of Fact page 2. 
12. He further contributed to the Petitioners support and maintenance by purchasing food. 
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See Judge George Findings of Fact Paragraph 14, page 4 and Industrial Commission 
Findings of Fact, page 2. 
13. The Deceased provided $400.00 per month to pay for bills and paid $150.00 toward the 
rent. See Judge George Findings of Fact, Paragraph 14, page 4 and Industrial 
Commission Findings of Fact page 2. 
14. The Deceased also increased the Petitioners lifestyle by entering into a contract for cable 
TV. See Judge George Findings of Fact, Paragraph 22, page 4 and Industrial Commission 
Findings of Fact page 2. 
15. The Deceased helped pay for utilities including the phone. See Judge George Findings of 
Fact, Paragraph 16, page 4, Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, page 2. 
16. The applicants testified that the Deceased was the man of the family. Hearing Transcript 
pages 14, 22. 
17. The parties held a joint bank account. See Hearing Transcript page 45, 46 and Industrial 
Commission Findings of Fact page 3. 
18. The Applicants both testified they enjoyed the relationship and arrangement. They had 
hope to continue this relationship and arrangement for considerable time. See testimony 
ofVernaCaporoz. 
19. Following the demise of the Deceased, the applicants could not maintain their lifestyle and 
standard of living. The Petitioners were forced to sell the couches, vehicles, loveseat, 
lounge chair, waterbed, TV and Roxsanne's bed. Furthermore, they could not afford cable 
nor go on any vacations. The telephone was shut off. See Judge George Findings of Fact 
Paragraphs 22 and 23, pages 4 and 5, Industrial Commission Findings of Fact page 3. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Workers Compensation Act of Utah intends that family members of a deceased 
worker receive benefits if the individual family member can show that dependency existed 
between the deceased and the family member. Dependency is based upon a question of fact and 
the underlying circumstances, and is not limited to an absolute dollar standard. Should 
dependency exist, Utah Law provides that accrued benefits are payable to the dependent or the 
estate, and the accrued benefits do not terminate due to the passing of the deceased. 
The Applicant's in this case are dependents. In reviewing the Findings of Fact one can 
only come to the conclusion that dependency existed and any benefits that had accrued from the 
date of the accident to the date of death, are due and payable to the dependents in accordance to 
Utah Law. 
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20. The applicants have not eaten as well as when the Deceased was alive. See Hearing 
Transcript pages 24 and 48. 
21. Both Applicants testified that they depended financially upon the Deceased. See Judge 
George Findings of Fact Paragraph 8, page 3. 
ARGUMENT 
The Petitioners fall within the Statutory meaning of Dependents. 
The Workers Compensation Act of Utah intended to provide benefits to family of a 
Deceased employee. The Applicants, both of whom are related to the Deceased, fall squarely in 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-71 in that Verna is a sister to the Deceased. In Utah Code Ann. Section 
35-1-71 it specifically states: " No person shall be considered as a dependent unless he or she is a 
member of the family of the Deceased employee, or bears the relation of husband or wife, lineal 
descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister. (Emphasis added) Roxsanne is a half-sister and is 
specifically included in the statute. Half brothers and half sisters shall be included in the words 
"brother or sister" as above used. (Emphasis added) 
Petitioners have the burden to prove that they are dependents. In Larsen's Section 63 it 
states: 
"Dependency in fact must be established in order to qualify for death benefits in all 
cases except those involving a conclusive presumption of dependency. Proof of 
actual dependency does not require a showing that the claimant relied on the 
deceased for the bare necessities of life and without that contribution would have 
been reduced to destitution; it is sufficient to show that the deceased's 
contributions were looked to by claimant for the maintenance of claimant's 
accustomed standard of living. Hence a claimant may be dependent although 
receiving other income from claimant's own work, from property, or from other 
persons on whom claimant is also dependent. Usually, actual contribution to 
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claimant's support is enough to establish dependency without evidence of legal 
obligation to support. 
In LPS Hospital v. Industrial Commission of Utah 901 P.2d 1164 (1987), the court defined 
"dependency". It states: 
"dependency within the meaning of our workers' compensation 
statutes does not mean absolute dependency for the necessities of 
life, but instead it means a need for and reliance on the worker's 
income to support and maintain the alleged dependent in 
accordance with his accustomed station in life." 
Larsen further indicates that "no absolute dollar standard by which to test either the 
magnitude of claimant's need or the magnitude of decedent's help in meeting that need. In fact 
there is Utah case law that shows a determination of dependency when the applicant was only 
receiving between $1.00 to $3.00 per month from the deceased. 
In Sizemore v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 288 P.2d 788 (1955), the court has 
suggested a 2-part test in deciding dependency. The Sizemore court has indicated the following: 
(l)(a) Dependency is primarily a question of fact, except in those 
cases covered by statutory presumption. While it is difficult to 
fashion a general definition to cover all situations which might 
constitute dependency, it should appear that at the time of the 
injury: 
(1) There existed some family or other social relationship giving 
rise to a legal or moral obligation to support; and 
(2) One or more of the following should be answered affirmatively: 
a. That claimant relied upon Deceased in whole or in part for 
support or maintenance. 
b. That it was reasonably necessary for the Deceased to render some financial 
assistance to claimant in order for him to maintain his accustomed standard of 
living; or 
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C. That claimant would in all probability have received some assistance from 
Deceased, had he continued to live. 
In this case, the Applicants fulfill the Sizemore test. The Applicants had a family 
relationship and the Deceased assumed a moral obligation to support. The applicants relied upon 
the Deceased in part for support or maintenance and it was reasonable for the Deceased to render 
said assistance to his sisters. Had the Deceased not past away, he would continue to help the 
Applicants. 
This case patterns after Roller Coaster Co. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 709 
(1948). In Roller Coaster, the Deceased, James Y. Hess, lived with his mother. He had paid 
varying amounts of money for Applicants purchasing clothing, school expense and groceries. The 
Deceased also maintained the garden and home. The Court specifically said "The Commission 
correctly found that the mother and minor sister were partly dependent on decedent for support at 
the time of his death". 
The Defendants and the Industrial Commission rely upon Farnsworth v. Industrial 
Commission, 534 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975). Farnsworth re-emphases the Sizemore tests as indicated 
the Rigby v. Industrial Commission. 286 P. 628 (1930), but denied benefits anyway. Farnsworth 
can be distinguished because of it's facts. In Farnsworth. the Father of the Deceased was making 
a claim. Even though the facts do not specify, it is understood that the Father was not living with 
the Deceased. The Deceased did not provide financial support. The Deceased made a claim for 
dependent benefits based on the fact that the Deceased provided transportation to the VA 
Hospital and to doctor appointments. The Deceased also performed yard-work and took his 
father on errands, "mainly to get him out of the house". The Applicant sometimes reimbursed or 
10 
paid the Deceased for his services. The Farnsworth court denied benefits because it was found 
that the "activities was not the type contemplated and intended within the meaning of the Workers 
Compensation Act". The Farnsworth court found that in order to be "dependent", the 
dependency must be based upon support. Specifically it states: "Case law (is) consistently limited 
to those fact situations wherein deceased contributed financial assistance or comparable assistance 
such as growing food, which was used in supporting the dependent". In the case at hand, the 
Petitioners were relying upon the financial as well as moral and emotional support that their 
brother offered and gave them. 
The Industrial Commission has indicated a wrong standard whether Petitioners are 
dependents. Specifically, the Industrial Commission indicates on page four: 
"While Mr Caporoz carried his share of household expenses, he did 
not subsidize his sisters' expenses. To the contrary, it appears that 
Mr. Caporoz and his sisters had developed a system of sharing 
common expenses, but that each of them paid their own personal 
expenses. While Mr. Caporoz may have occasionally treated his 
sisters to movies, admission to Lagoon or lodging and meals at 
Wendover, the Industrial Commission does not consider such items 
as significant to the support and maintenance of Ms. Caporoz or 
Ms. Clastimodo. (Emphasis added) 
The Industrial Commission has inserted terms such as "significant or subsidize" in 
determining whether dependency was necessary. These terms go beyond what was indicated or 
even contemplated by prior case law. Sizemore and Farnsworth were quite clear in determining 
dependency. Furthermore, to now insert such terms as stated above would go contrary to public 
policy or the intent of the Workers Compensation laws. It must be remembered that there cannot 
be an absolute dollar standard by which to test either the magnitude of claimant's need or the 
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magnitude of decedent's help in meeting those needs. See Larsen Section 63.10. Moreover, the 
applicants may have other substantial sources of support from work, from property, or from other 
persons on whom claimant is also dependent. The test is whether the Petitioners looked to the 
Decedent "for maintenance of an accustomed standard of living". It is clear from the facts that 
the Petitioners did in fact look to the Decedent for support. The Petitioners had Decedent pay the 
equivalent of the entire rent per month. The Decedent further provided food. The Decedent 
maintained the premises and automobiles. The Decedent purchased two other automobiles. The 
Decedent then treated the Petitioners to vacation and recreation. The Petitioners lifestyles were 
drastically changed when Decedent died. The automobiles were sold. The furniture was sold. 
The telephone and cable TV were cut off. No more recreation events or vacations. 
The purpose of the workers compensation statute is to alleviate the financial hardship on 
individual employees and those dependent upon them by spreading the cost of an injury 
throughout the industry that employs the worker. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
364 P.2d 1020 (1961), Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 156 P.2d 885 (1945). To further 
the purpose of the act, any doubt concerning the right of compensation must be resolved in favor 
of the injured worker and his dependents. See Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P. 2d 676 
(1990), J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission. 661 P.2d 949 (1983), Kaiser Steel Corp. 
v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (1981), McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153 (1977), Long 
v. Western States Refining Co., 384 P.2d 1015 (1963), M & K v. Industrial Commission. 189 
P.2d at 134 (1949). If there are any questions concerning whether there is dependency, one must 
resolve it in favor of an award. See Walls v. Industrial Commission, 857 P.2d 974 (1993) and 
Heaton. The Industrial Commission has failed to resolve any doubt concerning the right of 
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compensation in favor of the Petitioners. 
Is the estate of the Deceased entitled to an award of Temporary Total Disability 
Compensation from the date of his injury to the time of his death? 
In the case of Parker v. Industrial Commission. P.2d 278 (1935), the Utah Supreme Court 
had the opportunity to re-examine its position in the Heiselt Const. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
197 P. 589 (1921) case. The Parker court held: 
The payment of compensation is, in a sense, a disability wage, and is earned by 
operation of law. The conditions making it payable all pertaining, the employee is 
entitled to it just as much as he is entitled to wages earned by contract. As 
disability payments are "earned" they become vested, and if the employee dies 
before they are paid, his estate is entitled to them. 
In distinguishing it's prior decision in Heiselt the Court in Parker stated: 
In all of these cases, including the Heiselt Construction Co. Case, the question 
was to whether "unaccrued" payments for partial permanent disability passed to 
the estate. The question did not involve payments which had accrued for 
temporary total disability. . . . It is clear the court in that case did not intend to lay 
down any rule to the effect that compensation payments accrued at the time of the 
death would not pass to the estate. 
The Parker Court further attempted to distinguish Heiselt by noting that in the case that 
"No award had been made for permanent partial disability for the loss of parts of four fingers until 
after the death of the decedent". The Court went on in interpreting the predecessor to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 35-1-68 to find that: 
The language of R.S. Utah 1933, 42-1074, that compensation shall be paid only to 
employees or their dependents, is for the protection of the employees and their 
dependents and was not meant to deprive the estate of the deceased employee of 
compensation which was due and payable to him during his lifetime. 
Thus, in cases of temporary total disability compensation which has accrued, there is no 
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lapse at the time of the injured workers death and such benefits would be payable to his heirs. 
The deceased's benefits had accrued. The Industrial Commission has determined by rule when 
benefits have been deemed and payable. In Rule 568-1-12(1), it states that "Temporary Total 
compensation shall be due and payable within 21 days of the date of the accident". A review of 
Parker reveals that even though the facts of the case involved benefits which were awarded by the 
Commission prior to death, the language clearly indicates that benefits are "earned" and "vested" 
at the time they are due. The Court defined the point in time when benefits accrue as follows: 
The payment of compensation is, in a sense, a disability wage, and is earned by 
operation of law. The conditions making it payable all pertaining, the employee is 
entitled to it just as much as he is entitled to wages earned by contract. As 
disability payments are "earned" they become vested, and if the employee dies 
before they are paid, his estate is entitled to them. 
This is completely consistent with the fact that total temporary disability is actually wage 
replacement. As in this case, Mr. Caporoz, who was a wage earner prior to his accident, his 
dependents enjoyed and depended upon the wages he was bringing home prior to the accident. 
Had Mr. Caporoz been earning wages instead of workers compensation benefits, his estate would 
have been entitled to them. But for the Defendant's withholding of Applicant's benefits, his 
dependents would have enjoyed and depended upon those benefits, just as they did the wages, 
when he was earning them. Why then would his estate not be entitled to at least the total 
temporary benefits which had already accrued at the time of his death? 
The applicant was mortally injured on May 17, 1994. He did not pass away until 
December 17, 1994. Thus, the Deceased's temporary total disability payments were earned. The 
fact that Defendants did not pay these benefits when they were due and that the Applicant died 
before his case was heard by the Industrial Commission should not create an unfair and improper 
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windfall for the Defendants at the expense of the deceased's heirs. The Parker court stated: 
The fact that by accident a warrant had not been issued or there had been a failure 
to pay him should not inure to the benefit of the parties who should have paid the 
compensation. The law will consider that done which should have done and not 
permit those who are obligated and should have paid the compensation to obtain 
the advantage of a fortuitous circumstance. Because the warrant was not made 
out and delivered to him cannot in logic, injustice, or in reason affect the right of 
his personal representative to collect the compensation nor relive the employer or 
the state insurance fund of the obligation to pay it. 
The Industrial Commission and Administrative Law Judge have certain duties and 
responsibilities to make appropriate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The "Industrial Commission must always weigh any conflicting evidence, carefully 
considering all factors, without giving particular deference to either side". In IHC v. Board of 
Review, 839 P.2d 841 (1992), the Court of Appeals requires that "determinations regarding 
factual circumstances surround industrial injury must be ruled on by Administrative Law Judge. 
In Adams, the Court of Appeals has indicated that the Agency "must make findings of 
fact and conclusions of law that are adequately detailed to permit meaningful appellate review". 
The failure to disclose specific subsidiary findings may or may not be fatal to agency's decision, 
where agency's findings reveal steps taken by agency in reaching its decision. In this case, there is 
no method of how either Judge George or the Industrial Commission determined that Petitioners 
were not dependents taking into consideration their findings. 
In Price River Coal Co v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 1079 (1986), the inadequacy 
of administrative law judge's findings justified remanding the matter back to the hearing level for 
resolution of conflicting testimony, findings and determination. This case should be remanded for 
further hearings.. One that will properly enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
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In reviewing the Findings of Fact, one can only come to the conclusion that the Petitioners 
were in fact partially dependent upon the Deceased and that Temporary Total Disability 
Compensation had accrued since the date of the accident up to Decedent's demise. 
CONCLUSION 
Applicants are dependents of the Deceased. They fall into the statutory category under 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-71 as both Applicants are sisters to the Deceased. The Applicants relied 
upon Deceased's support and maintenance. It was reasonable for Deceased to provide the 
financial assistance. The Deceased and Applicants would have enjoyed future support and 
assistance had the Deceased not past away. Applicants, therefore, should be entitled to benefits 
under the Utah Workers Compensation Act pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68. 
The Applicants should be entitled to the Temporary Total Disability Compensation as they 
are dependents of the Deceased. The TTD had accrued and was payable according to the 
Industrial Commission rules and 35-1-65. To rule otherwise would be unfair and create an 
improper windfall to the Defendants. 
Dated this 3 5 day of March, 1997. ^ ^ ^s 
David W. Parker 
Attorney for Petitioners/Appellants 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
VERNA CAPOROZ & ROXSANNE 
CLASTIMODO, Sisters of BARNEY 
CAPOROZ (Deceased) 
Plaintiff(s) 
v. 
GUILLERMO RODRIGUEZ and/or 
MARGARET RODRIGUEZ and/OR 
WILLIE RODRIGUEZ and/or TIM 
FRAGA dba HANDYMAN WILLIE 
^uuuiMi i cu j , u i N i i N o u r o : u XLivir i_v^ i JCIVO 
FUND 
Defendant(s) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
• ) • 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No:95415 
Judge: Donald L. George 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 27, 1995 at 3:00 o'clock p.m. same 
being pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Donald L. George, Administrative Law Judge. 
The Applicants, Verna Caporoz and Roxsanne Clastimado, were 
represented by David W. Parker, Attorney at Law. 
The respondent, Uninsured Employers' Fund was represented by Sharon J. 
Eblen, Attornev 
The respondents, Guillermo Rodriguez, Margaret Rodriguez, Willie 
Rodriguez, Tim Fraga dba handyman Willie, did not appear. 
This case involves a claim for medical and burial expenses for xK€7Jecedent^ fiarney \ -^  
Caporoz and dependents benefits for his sister Verna Caporoz and his h^sister Ro#Sanne[S «i 
Clastimado (hereafter known as sisters). Roxsanne Clastimado was joined as an applicant at the 
hearing upon motion of her attorney. The Uninsured Employers1 Fund did not object to joinder. 
Following the hearing, a conference call was held between Judge Donald L. George David W. 
Parker and Sharon Eblen. Ms. Eblen was ordered by Judge Donald L. George to prepare up 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Mr. Parker objected to said proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and forwarded his suggestions to Ms. Eblen. Ms. Eblen 
could not agree on the new proposals. In said conference call, Judge Donald L. George then 
ordered that Temporary Total Disability be paid to Barney Caporoz estate from May 8, 1994 to 
December 17, 1994 and for burial expenses. A second conference call was initiated by Judge 
Donald L. George to David W. Parker. Ms. Eblen was located in chambers with Judge George. 
At the second conference all, Judge George denied Temporary Total Disability benefits. Judge 
George also found that there is not enough evidence to show insolvency of Defendants which can 
be petitioned by Applicants at a later date. Questions also were raised on who were the 
defendants. Judge George, prior to the hearing, and through his own investigation found that 
Willie Rodriguez a.k.a. Guillermo Rodriguez was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. Judge 
George also called the former phone number of Handyman Willie and talked with Margaret 
Rodriguez and Tim Fraga. It was Judge George's impression that Margaret Rodriguez and Tim 
Fraga were operating Handyman Willie. Judge George then sua sponte named them as defendants 
and notice was provided to them of the hearing. 
The respondent employer. Guillermo Rodriguez a.k.a. Willie Rodriguez dha Handyman 
Willie did not appear at the hearing and default was entered against him at that time. Margaret 
Rodriguez and Tim Fraga were also notified of the hearing and did not appear and therefore 
default was entered against them at that same time. The Uninsured Employers' Fund did not 
dispute the claim or Defendant Guillermo Rodriguez and/or Margaret Rodriguez and/or Willie 
Rodriguez and/or Tim Fraga dba Handyman Willie's liability for medical bills, and burial 
expenses, up-to the statutory maximum of 54,000.00. The only dispute to be resolved at the 
hearing was whether the sisters of Barney Caporoz were his partial dependents on the date of 
decedent's industrial accident. 
Because of a pending illness of Sharon Eblen, Judge Donald L. George requested that 
Applicant's attorney draft up the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order following the 
second conference call. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Barney Caporoz was injured in a compensable industrial accident in which he suffered 
o 
massive internal and external injuries to his head on May 7, 1994. He died as a result of 
his injuries on December 17, 1994. • «• *2 *! 2 « 
On the date of his accident, Caporoz was working for W. Rodriguez, dba Handyman 
Willie earning an average weekly wage of S225.00 per week, therefore theTcmporary 
Total Disability rate would be SI 50.00. 
Presently W. Rodriguez is serving a sentence at the Utah State Prison. 
Verna Caporoz and Roxsanne Clastimado, sisters of Barney Caporoz, moved to Utah 
from Hawaii and shared a home. They moved to Ogden from Salt Lake City when Verna 
went to work at IOMEGA. 
At that time they rented the three bedroom home in Ogden in the amount of S275.00 per 
month. 
Verna paid the expenses to move into the house in Ogden (deposit, etc). 
i» _«..». «.«. * u » u ~ . . ~ ~ . . . $ \ i~— - - . . . _ - « i - . - i * - o- A /» r \ r*r» . . . - - . _ . . . 1 . - - J *•- - * 
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needed assistance and support to pay the rent and other expenses. 
In order to remain in the home, Barney Caporoz moved in with them to share expenses. 
The applicants testified they could not afford to move. 
When Barney moved in with his sisters, his sisters owned one bed, a dining room set with 
three chairs and some dishes. 
Barney bought himself a waterbed and some couches and other furniture for the family. 
The three siblings purchased a television set. Barney paid for cable T. V. 
While Barney lived with his sisters, they purchased three vehicles, all registered to Verna 
Caporoz. Insurance on the vehicles was SI06.00 per month. 
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13. Barney Caporoz paid for all recreation and vacations including several trips to Lagoon, 
*°Z «% >'* »>? " J 
Raging Waters, and Wendover. Barney also maintained the cars*$nd hpme tit order Idl 2 
reduce expenses. 
14. Verna paid $175.00 per month toward rent and bills plus $40.00 per month on expenses. 
Barney paid a total of $400.00 per month toward rent and bills ($150.00 towards rent). 
Roxsanne paid $75.00 per month towards rent and about $30.00 for food. Barney paid 
out of his own pocket for all other food for the family. 
15. Utilities such as electricity, water, sewer and trash pick up were included in the rent. 
16. Each sibling paid his or her own portion of the telephone bill. They siblings purchased a 
pearl necklace and bracelet for their mother at Zales on Verna's credit card. Barney 
sometimes bought clothes on Verna's JC Penney credit card. 
17. At the time of his death, Barney Caporoz was earning 5225.00 per week. Verna Caporoz 
was earning 5220.00 per week and Roxsanne Clastimodo was earning 5170.00 per week. 
18. At the time of Barney's death, he was 33 years old, Verna was 35 years old and Roxsanne 
was 30 years old. 
19. Verna quit her job after Barney was injured in May 1994 and was unemployed until 
September 1994 to tend to him. 
20. Verna is currently working and earning 51500.00 per month before taxes. Roxsanne is 
currently working 20 hours per week at minimum wage. 
21. Verna testified that she is currently paying off personal debt at a rate of 5250.00 to 
$275.00 per month. 
22. After Barney's injury, the cable T. V. and phone were cut off and they had to sell their 
4 
furniture, cars, T.V., beds and washer and dryer. 
• . • % i 1 » • '•> ••> 
23. Barney paid for vacations for himself and his sisters. The appiiga$ts can no longer j&ffojd 
to take vacations. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . — 
The applicants, Verna Caporoz and Roxsanne Clastimado, were not partial dependents of 
their brother, Barney Caporoz. Accordingly, they are not entitled to payment of dependent's 
benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Section 35-1-68, U.C.A. 
The Defendants, Guillermo Rodriguez and/or Margaret Rodriguez and/or Willie 
Rodriguez and/or Tim Fraga dba Handyman Willie, are liable to pay all medical expenses resulting 
from the industrial accident and burial expenses up to the statutory maximum of $4,000.00, 
pursuant to Sections 35-1-45 and 35-1-68, U.C.A. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the applicants* claim for death benefits based upon 
partial dependency is dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that default is entered against defendants Guillermo 
Rodriguez and/or Margaret Rodriguez and/or Willie Rodriguez and/or Tim Fraga dba Handyman 
based upon their failure to answer the application for benefits and failure to appear at the hearing 
after proper notice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Guillermo Rodriguez and/or Margaret 
Rodriguez and/or Willie Rodriguez and/or Tim Fraga dba Handyman Willie shall pay all medical 
expenses reasonably related to Barney Caporoz' industrial accident of May 7, 1994. Said medical 
expenses have been submitted to the Uninsured Employers Fund. Said payment includes 
5 
reimbursement to Medicaid for the amounts expended. 
m i S FURTHER ORDERED the defendants, Guillermo Rodriguez and/or Margaret 
Rodriguez, and/br Willie Rodriguez and/or 11m Frage dba Handyman Willie reimburse the estate 
of BarneyiCaporoz for burial expenses for Barney Caporoz up to the statutory maximum of 
S4,000.00ito the estate of Barney Caporoz. 
ITIIS FURTHER ORDERED that any Morion for Review of the foregoing shall bc-filed 
in writing hvithiri thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. In 
the* event a Motion for Review is timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the date 
of filing wath the Commission, in which to file a written response with the Commission in 
accordance with Section 63-46b-12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
That this Order shall be construed as constituting an "Award" within the meaning of r A.-
Utah Workers* Compensation and Occupational Disease and Disability Act, generally^ and Is :.A.: 
Section 3i-l-44*(7) (1953) and U.C.A. Section 35-01-78 (1981). inter alia, specifically. 
Dated: this £ i £ _ cay of APRIL J996. ^ ^ ^ 4 ^ ^ 
Honorable Donald L. George 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAYING 
% certify that on April <3 , 1996- a copy was of the attached 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law a™i Order, in the case of 
Barney Caporoz, Deceased, was mailed V° the following persons at 
the fallowing addresses, postage paid: 
Verna Caporoz Ti*& Fraga/Handyman Willie 
2176 North 4500 West 27*9 Adams Avenue 
Plain City, UT 84404 oqten, UT 84401 
Roxsanne Clastimodo 
2176 North 4500 West 
Plain City, UT 84404 
David W. Parker 
Attorney at Law 
50 West 300 South, Suite 900 
Scott Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
205 26th Street, #34 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Sharon Eblen 
Attorney at Law 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
P.O. Box 146612 
SLC, UT 84114-6612 
Guillersio D. Rodriguez 
P. 0. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
Willie Rodriguez 
Margrett A. Rodriguez 
651 28th Street 
Ogden UT 844 01 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Wipaa Burrows 
Adjudicati°n Division 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH 
VERNA CAPOROZ and * 
ROXSANNE CLASTIMODO, * 
Sisters of BARNEY * ORDER DENYING 
CAPOROZ, deceased, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
Applicants, * 
v * 
GUILLERMO RODRIGUEZ, Margaret * 
RODRIGUEZ and TIM FRAGA, dba * Case No. 95-0415 
HANDY MAN WILLIE, and THE * 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND, * 
Defendants. * 
Verna Caporoz and Roxsanne Clastimodo ask The Industrial 
Commission of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judgefs 
decision denying cheir clairr. for dzzzr+zzr+zz' scncrits and tiie claim 
of the estate of Barney Caporoz for temporary total disability 
compensation under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. The 
Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for 
review pursuant to Utah Cede Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §3 5-1-
82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUS PR5SSNT5P 
1) Were Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo dependents of Mr. 
Caporoz and therefore entitled to the benefits provided by §35-1-73 
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"). 2) Is Mr. 
Caporoz' estate entitled to temporary total disability compensation 
for the period between his accident and death? 3) Did the ALJ fail 
to properly consider and resolve the factual and legal issues 
presented by applicants' claim? 
FINDINGS QF FACT 
On May 17, 1994, while working for Kandy Man Willie, Mr. 
Caporoz was injured by accident arising ouc of and in the course of 
his employment. Mr. Caporoz died from his injuries on December 17, 
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1994. At the time of his accident, Mr. Caporoz resided with his 
sisters Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo. 
My. Caporoz was 33 years old at the time of his death. Ms. 
Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo were 35 and 30 years old, respectively. 
Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo had come to Utah from Hawaii 
approximately six years earlier. They had first lived together in 
Salt Lake City, then moved to Plain City. When Mr. Caporoz came to 
Utah tiiree years later, he too lived in the Plain City home. 
Mr. Caporoz and his sisters were each employed. Mr. Caporoz 
and Ms. Caporoz earned approximately the same income while Ms. 
Clastimodo earned somewhat less. He paid $400 per month as his 
share of rent and other basic household expenses. His contribution 
was placed in his sisters1 checking account, as were his sisters' 
earnings. Ms. Caporoz then paid rent and other household expenses 
out of this checking account. Such expenses included rent at $400 
per mcntJk, automobile insurance oZ $105 pci muuLii, payments on some 
charge accounts, and other household needs. i 
in addition to Mr. Caporoz' monthly payment toward household 
expenses, he purchases food items that were shared with his 
sisters. He also paid for cable television service and his share 
of long distance telephone charges. He occasionally provided his 
sisters with money for movies. On several occasions he paid for 
travel and lodging in Wendcver, Nevada and for day trips to Lagoon 
Amusement Park. 
! 
At the time Mr. Caporoz joined his sisters, they already owned 
some furniture, including table and chairs, beds, loveseat, two 
living room chairs and a television set. They also had basic 
household items such as dishes, utensils and pans necessary for 
their home. After Mr. Caporoz arrived, he purchased several items 
of second-hand furniture, including a bed for himself, a couch and 
other living room furniture. The family acquired two used motor 
vehicles in addition to the automobile Ms. Caporoz already owned. 
immediately after Mr. Caporoz was injured at work, Ms. Caporoz 
quit her job in order to be with her brother an the hospital. She 
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remained off work for five months, during which time she and her 
sister fell behind on their financial obligations- They were 
compelled to sell various items of personal property. Now that Ms. 
Caporoz has returned to work, she and her sister are meeting their 
current obligations and are slowly repaying their accumulated debt. 
They continue to reside in the Plain City home. 
On May 5, 1995, Ms. Caporoz filed a claim for dependent's 
benefits and burial expense with the Industrial Commission. It 
does not appear that any claim was ever filed on behalf of Mr. 
Caporoz for temporary total disability compensation for the period 
between his injury and death. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
I, DEPENDENTS/ BENEFITS; 
When an accident causes the death of a worker, §35-1-68(5)(b) 
of the Act provides survivors' benefits to family members1 who were 
dependent on the deceased worker for their support. • In this case, 
the parties agree that Mr. Caporoz' death arose out of and in the 
course of his employment at Handy Man Willies. The only issue in 
dispute is.whether Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo were partially 
dependent upon Mr. Caporoz for their support. 
...Ms..,..Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo 'bear the burden of ..proving 
dependency,2 which is a question of fact that must be made on a 
case by case basis. They must establish that they relied upon the 
deceased worker for support, that had the deceased worker not been 
1
 Those family members eligible for survivors' benefits are 
identified in ^35-1-71 of the Act and include sisters and half 
sisters. 
2
 Minor children, disabled children and surviving spouses are 
generally presumed to be dependent, pursuant to §35-1-71 of the 
Act." However, no presumption of dependency exists with respect to 
surviving siblings. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
VERNA CAPOROZ and ROXSANNE CLASTIMODO 
(BARNEY CAPOROZ, deceased) 
PAGE 4 
killed, the applicants would have continued to receive some 
assistance, and that it was reasonable necessary for the deceased 
worker to render aid to the applicants to allow them to maintain 
their accustomed standard of living. Famsvnrth v. Industrial 
Commission/ 534 P.2d 897, 899 (1975), citing Pigby v. Industrial 
Commission. 75 Utah 454, 286 P. 628 (1930). 
Applying the foregoing test to the facts of this case, the 
Industrial^Commission concludes~Ms:"Caporoz and..Ms".".Clastimodo have 
n^restablished "they were dependent upon Mrv.-.Caporoz within the 
meaning"of'".'S35-1-68 of the Act. While Mr;--.Caporoz "carried his 
share ~~of .household .expenses/ he did .not subsidize his -sisters' 
e^lcpenses. To the contrary, it appears that Mr. Caporoz and his 
sisters had^deyeloped a system of sharing common expenses, but. that*' 
each of them paid their own personal expenses. While Mr. Caporoz 
may have occasionally treated his sisters to movies, admission to 
Lagoon or lodging and meals at Wendover, the Industrial Commission 
aoes not consiaer sucn items as significant to the support and 
maintenance of Ms. Caporoz or Ms. Clastimodo. 
The Industrial Commission also concludes that Mr. Caporoi' 
financial participation was not necessary for Ms. Caporoz and Ms. 
Clastimodo to maintain their standard of living. It*appears that 
the financial difficult suffered by Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo 
after their brother's injury resulted from the fact that Ms. 
Caporoz stopped working, rather than the loss of support from Mr. 
Caporoz. 
In light of the foregoing, the Industrial Commission affirms 
the determination of the ALJ that Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo 
were not dependent upon Mr. Caporoz and are not entitled to 
dependents' benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
TT. T^MPOPAPV TOTAL DISABILITY COMPOSITION-
Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo ask the Industrial Commission 
to order payment of temporary total disability compensation to Mr. 
Caporoz' estate for the period between Mr. Caporoz' accident and 
his death. The Industrial Commission is unaware that any claim for 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
VERNA CAPOROZ and ROXSANNE CLASTIMODO 
(BARNEY CAPOROZ, deceased) 
PAGE 5 
temporary total disability compensation was filed prior to Mr. 
Caporoz' death. IJtT^i^^e^ 
made prior^o^Ms^deathl Under such circumstances, the decision of 
tHeTutahT Supreme Court in Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v, 
Industrial Commission. 218 P.2d 970, 974 (1950), is controlling: 
The right to compensation for injuries is a right 
personal to the employee and unless payments have accrued 
or a determination has been made by the Commission there 
is no right;to which the personal representative or a 
dependent can succeed.; 
Because no temporary total disability compensation accrued to 
MrT^Caporoz before his" death, amy claim he might have had to such 
compensation expired with his death. Therefore, the ALJ ..correctly 
declined " to order payment of temporary total disability 
compensation to Mr. Caporoz' estate. 
Ill, ALJ'S CONSIDERATION OF DISPUTSS OF FACT AND LAW; 
Ms. Caporoz and Ms. Clastimodo contend that the ALJ improperly 
deferred to the analysis and arguments of the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund, thereby failing to weigh and resolve factual and legal issues 
according to his own judgment. 
The Industrial Commission finds no merit to this argument. It 
is the written decision, signed and issued by the ALJ, which must 
be taken as the ALJ's final judgment in this case. Even if the 
contents of a decision have been suggested by the evidence and 
arguments of a party, the ALJ manifested his own judgment by 
signing the decision. Of course, the decision must properly apply 
the law and be supported by the evidence. Any.party believing the 
decision Jto be deficient may obtain review by the Industrial 
Commission, which has authority to modify the ALJ's findings of 
fact and application of law. In this case, the Industrial 
Commission has reviewed the testimony, documentary record and 
arguments of the parties. Based on that review, the Industrial 
Commission agrees with the ALJ's determination. 
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ORDER 
The Industrial Commission affirms the ALJ's decision and 
denies Vis. Caporo* 3tod Ms. Clast-iTnodo* s motion iox review. It, is 
so ordered. 
NOTICE OF APPSAL RIgHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this 
Order. Any such request for reconsideration must be received by 
the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of 
Appeals by filing a petition for review with the court. Any such 
petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MftlLINS 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion 
For Review in the matter of Barney Caporoz Case No. 95-0415 was 
mailed first class postage prepaid thisB^ $ffi day of October, 1996, 
to the following^: 
DAVID W. PARKER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
BANK ONE TOWER, SUITE 900 
50 WEST 300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101-1218 
TIM FRAGA 
276 9 ADAMS AVENUE 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
VERNA CAPOROZ 
2176 NORTH 400 WEST 
FioAHN L U I ; UTAtt 6 4 4 U 4 
ROXSANNE CLASTIMODO 
2176 NORTH 4500 WEST 
PLAIN CITY, UTAH 84404 
SHARON E3LEN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND 
P O BOX 146612 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-6612 
GUILLERMO D. RODRIGUEZ 
P O BOX 250 
DRAPER, UTAH 84020 
WILLIE RODRIGUEZ 
MARGARET A. RODRIGUEZ 
651 28TH STREET * 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
Adell Butljer-Mitchell 
Support Specialist 
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Utah Code §35-1-86 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 35. LABOR-INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CHAPTER 1. WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
Current through End of 1996 General and 2nd Special Sessions 
§ 35-1-86. Court of Appeals may review commission's actions 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul any order of the commission, or to 
suspend or delay the operation or execution of any order. 
As last amended by Chapter 72, Laws of Utah 1988. 
REPEAL 
< Repealed by Laws 1996, c. 240, § 376, effective July 1, 1997 > 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt. 
works. 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 35. LABOR-INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CHAPTER 1. WORKERS1 COMPENSATION 
Current through End of 1996 General and 2nd Special Sessions 
§ 35-1-71. Dependents—Presumption 
< Text effective until July 1,1997 > 
The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: 
(1) Children under the age of 18 years, or over if physically or mentally incapacitated and dependent uponl 
the parent, with whom they are living at the time of the death of such parent, or who is legally bound for their | 
support. 
(2) For purposes of payments to be made under Subsection 35-1-68 (2)(a)(i), a surviving husband or wife 
shall be presumed to be wholly dependent upon a spouse with whom he or she lived at the time of the 
employee's death. 
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with 
the facts in each particular case existing at the time of the injury or death of such employee, except for 
purposes of dependency reviews under Subsection 35-1-68 (2)(a)(iii). No person shall be considered as a 
dependent unless he or she is a member of the family of the deceased employee, or bears the relation of 
husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall 
include a posthumous child, and a child legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and half sisters 
shall be included in the words "brother or sister" as above used. 
As last amended by Chapter 126, Laws of Utah 1987. 
< For text as renumbered and amended effective July 1, 1997, see § 35A-3-403 > 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt. 
works. 
UT ST § 35-1-68, Employers1 Reinsurance Fund—Injury causing Page 1 
death—Burial expenses—Payments to dependents 
Utah Code §35-1-68 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 35. LABOR-INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CHAPTER 1. WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
Current through End of 1996 General and 2nd Special Sessions 
§ 35-1-68. Employers' Reinsurance Fund—Injury causing death—Burial expenses-
Payments to dependents 
< Text effective until July 1, 1997 > 
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the purpose of making payments for industrial 
accidents or occupational diseases occurring on or before June 30, 1994. The payments shall be made in 
accordance with Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2. The Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall have no liability for 
industrial accidents or occupational diseases occurring on or after July 1, 1994. This fund shall succeed to 
all monies previously held in the "Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund." or the "Second Injury Fund." 
Whenever this code refers to the "Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund" 
that reference is considered to be the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. The state treasurer shall be the 
custodian of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall make provisions for and direct its 
distribution. Reasonable costs of administration or other fees may be paid from the fund. 
(2) The state treasurer shall: 
(a) receive workers' compensation premium assessments from the State Tax Commission; and 
(b) invest the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to ensure maximum investment return for both long and short 
term investments in accordance with Section 51-7-12.5. 
(3) The commission may employ or retain counsel to represent the Employers' Reinsurance Fund in 
proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on behalf of the fund. Upon request of the commission, the 
attorney general shall aid in representation of the fund. 
(4) The liability of the state, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, elected or appointed officials, or 
other duly authorized agents, with respect to payment of any compensation benefits, expenses, fees, medical 
expenses, or disbursement properly chargeable against the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, is limited to the 
cash or assets in the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and they are not otherwise, in any way, liable for the 
operation, debts, or obligations of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
(5) If injury causes death within a period of 312 weeks from the date of the accident, the employer or 
insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as provided in Section 35-1-81, and further 
benefits in the amounts and to the persons as follows: 
*9923 (a)(i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment by the employer 
or its insurance carrier shall be 66- 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but 
not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
Copyright (c) West Publishing Co. 1996 No claim to original U.S. Govt. 
works. 
UT ST § 35-1-68, Employers' Reinsurance Fund—Injury causing Page 2 
death—Burial expenses—Payments to dependents 
less than a minimum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent minor 
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding 
the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, and not exceeding 85% of the state 
average wreekly wage at the time of the injury per week. Compensation shall continue during dependency for 
the remainder of the period between the date of the death and the expiration of 312 weeks after the date of the 
injury. 
I 
(ii) The payment by the employer or its insurance carrier to wholly dependent persons during dependency 
following the expiration of the first 312-week period described in Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be an amount 
equal to the weekly benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons during that initial 312-week period, 
reduced by 50% of any weekly federal Social Security death benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons. 
I 
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the commission at the end of the initial 
312-week period and annually thereafter. If in any such review it is determined that, under the facts and 
circumstances existing at that time, the applicant is no longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may 
be considered a partly dependent or nondependent person and shall be paid such benefits as the commission 
may determine under Subsection (5)(b)(ii). 
I 
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse of a deceased employee shall be 
conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a 312-week period from the date of death of the employee. 
This presumption shall not apply after the initial 312-week period and, in determining the then existing 
annual income of the surviving spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any federal Social Security 
death benefits received by that surviving spouse. | 
(b)(i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment shall be 66- 2/3% of the 
decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week. 
Compensation shall continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the date of death 
and the expiration of 312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each case may determine. 
Compensation may not amount to more than a maximum of $30,000. The benefits provided for in this! 
subsection shall be in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of 
injury7, and any amount awarded by the commission under this subsection shall be consistent with the general 
provisions of this title. 
*9924 (ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent under Subsection (5)(a)(iii) shall be 
determined by the commission in keeping with the circumstances and conditions of dependency7 existing at 
the time of the dependency review and may be paid in an amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate 
that partly dependent persons would receive if wholly dependent. 
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during their dependency by the employer or 
its insurance carrier. 
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent persons at the time of death, the 
commission may apportion the benefits as it considers just and equitable; provided, that the total benefits 
awarded to all parties concerned do not exceed the maximum provided for by law. 
As last amended by Chapter 266, Laws of Utah 1994. 
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R568-1-4. Pleadings and Discovery. 
A. For the purposes of > Section 63-46b-3, U.C.A., all adjudicative proceedings for 
workers' compensation and occupational disease claims shall only be commenced by the injured 
worker or dependent filing a request for agency action with the Commission. The Administrative 
Law Judge is afforded discretion in allowing intervention of other parties pursuant to > Section 
63-46b-9, U.C.A. The Application for Hearing is the request for agency action. All such 
applications shall include supporting medical documentation of the claim where there is a 
dispute over medical issues. Applications without supporting documentation will not be mailed 
to the employer or insurance carrier for answer until the appropriate documents have been 
provided. 
B. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by an employer or insurance 
carrier, the burden rests on the applicant to initiate the action by filing an Application for 
Hearing with the Commission. 
C When an Application for Hearing is filed with the Commission, the Commission shall 
forthwith mail a copy to the employer or to the employer's insurance carrier. 
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30 days following the date of the mailing 
of the application to file a written answer with the Industrial Commission, admitting or denying 
liability for the claim. The answer should state all affirmative defenses with sufficient 
accuracy and detail that an applicant may be fully informed of the nature of the defense 
asserted. All answers shall include a summary and categorization of benefits paid to date on 
the claim. A copy shall be sent to the applicant or, if there is one, to the applicant's 
attorney by the defendant. 
E. When an employer or insurance carrier fails to file an answer within the 30 days 
provided above, the Commission may enter a default against such employer or insurance carrier. 
The Commission may then set the matter for hearing, take evidence bearing on the claim, and 
enter an Order based on the evidence presented. Such defaults may be set aside by following the 
procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Said default shall apply to the 
defendant employer or insurance carrier and shall not be construed to deprive the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund of any appropriate defenses. 
Excerpt from page 6516 follows 
F. Where the answer denies liability solely on the medical aspects of the case, the 
applicant, through his/her attorney or agent, and the employer or insurance carrier, with the 
approval of the Commission or its representative, may enter into a stipulated set of facts, 
which stipulation, together with the medical documents bearing on the case in the Commission's 
file, may be used in making the final determination of liability. 
G. When deemed appropriate, the Commission or its representatives may have a pre-hearing or 
post-hearing conference. 
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence discovery with appropriate sets of 
interrogatories. Such discovery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as well as past 
and present medical care. The defendant shall also be entitled to appropriately signed medical 
releases to allow gathering of pertinent medical records. The defendant may also require the 
applicant to submit to an independent medical examination to be conducted by a physician of the 
defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with such requests may result in the 
dismissal of a claim or a delay in the scheduling of a hearing. 
I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery proceedings and must be signed, 
unless good cause is shown for a shorter period, at least one week prior to any scheduled 
hearing. 
J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer or its insurance carrier as a single 
joint exhibit at least one week before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must cooperate and 
submit all pertinent medical records contained in his file to the employer or its insurance 
carrier for the joint exhibit submission two weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing. Exhibits 
are to be placed in an indexed binder arranged by care provider in chronological order. 
Exhibits should include all relevant treatment records with the exception of hospital nurses 
notes. 
K. The Administrative Law Judge must be notified one week in advance of any proceeding 
where it is anticipated that more than four witnesses will be called, or where it is anticipated 
that the hearing of the evidence will require more than two hours. 
L. Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative proceeding will be issued in 
accordance with the provisions of > Section 63-46b-5 or > 63-46b-10, U.C.A. 
M. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding seeking review of an Order by the Agency may 
file a written request for review in accordance with the provisions of > Sections 63-46b-12, 
63-46b- 13, > 63-46b-14, > 63-46b-15, and > 63-46b-16, U.C.A. A Motion for Review of any order 
entered by an Administrative Law Judge may be filed pursuant to the provisions of > Section 
63-46b-12, U.C.A. Unless so filed, the Order will become the award of the Commission and will be 
final. If appropriately filed, the Administrative Law Judge may: 
Excerpt from page 6517 follows 
1. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after holding such further hearing and 
receiving such further evidence as may be deemed necessary, 2. Amend or modify the prior Order 
by a Supplemental order, or 
3. Refer the entire case to the Commission for review under > Section 35-1-82.53, U.C.A. 
If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental Order, as provided above, it shall be 
final unless a Motion for Review of the same is filed with the Commission. 
N. In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Industrial Commission shall generally follow the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are modified by the express provisions of > Section 35-1-88, 
U.C.A., or as may be otherwise modified by the presiding officer. 
0. A request for reconsideration of a Commission's Order on Motion for Review may be 
allowed and shall be governed by the provisions of > Section 63-46b-13, U.C.A. Any petition for 
judicial review of the Commission's Order on Motion for Review shall be governed by the 
provisions of > Section 63-46b-14, U.C.A. 
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R568-1-12. Interest. 
A. Interest must be paid on each benefit payment which comprises the award from the date 
that payment would have been due and payable at the rate of 8% per annum. 
B. For the purpose of interest calculation, benefits shall become ""due and payable'1 (as 
used in > Section 35-1-78, U.C.A.) as follows: 
1. Temporary total compensation shall be due and payable within 21 days of the date of the 
accident. 
2. Permanent partial compensation shall be due and payable on the next day following the 
termination of a temporary total disability. However, where the condition is not fixed for 
rating purposes, the interest shall commence from the date the permanent partial impairment can 
be medically determined. 
3. Permanent partial or permanent total disability compensation payable by the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be due and payable as soon as reasonably 
practical after an order is issued. 
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